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Half-yearly report 
on the Latin-American 
economy
1. INTRODUCTION
In early 2004 Latin America has enjoyed the 
most favourable financing conditions of recent 
years: a virtual absence of exchange rate pres-
sures; current-account surpluses, in many cas-
es; access to foreign capital markets under fa-
vourable terms; and sovereign spreads at simi-
lar levels to those prior to the 1998 Russian cri-
sis. However, the region continues to exhibit 
high fiscal and financial vulnerability and faces 
uncertainty on certain fronts in the coming 
months. Doubts centre, first, on retaining inter-
national financial investors’ favourable disposi-
tion to the area, following the high returns ac-
cumulated, when there is a possibility that US 
interest rates may rise in the coming quarters; 
and further, on regaining the ability to attract 
foreign direct investment, following the turbu-
lence of recent years. Against this background, 
the pick-up in economic activity towards late 
2003 placed the annual growth rate slightly be-
low 3% in Q4. As a result, growth in Latin Amer-
ica for the year as a whole turned positive again 
(1.3%, against -0.2% in 2002), but this did not 
prevent the third consecutive annual decline in 
per capita income. The recovery is expected to 
firm during 2004, although the delay with which 
this is occurring in the two biggest economies - 
Mexico and, above all, Brazil - calls for an addi-
tional note of caution regarding the region’s 
overall outlook.
During the second half of 2003, interest 
rates in the United States and in Europe, too, 
held stable at all maturities. In spite of expecta-
tions of a global economic recovery, supported 
by favourable data in the second half of the year 
particularly in the United States and Japan (see 
Chart 1), and of the growing US fiscal imbal-
ances, there was no upward shift in the yield 
curve. This was due perhaps to the sound per-
formance of inflation, which provided for a con-
tinuing accommodating monetary policy stance, 
and, in the case of the United States, possibly 
to the intense build-up of Treasury bonds by 
Asian central banks. The firming of the recovery 
and the search for returns in a less risk-averse 
environment marked by abundant liquidity ex-
erted, by contrast, a notable effect on the cor-
porate bond market, where spreads narrowed 
to the lowest levels since 2000 (see Chart 1). 
That was propitious during the second half of 
the year to stock markets, whose earnings dou-
bled in relation to the first six months.
All these factors contributed to consolidating, 
in the second half of 2003, the improvement in 
Latin American financial markets while, at the 
same time, capital inflows were recovering in 
relation to 2002, albeit without attaining the lev-
els of prior years. The narrowing of sovereign 
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spreads continued, in parallel with that of corpo-
rate junk bonds and with emerging regions’ 
bonds, albeit at a more measured pace than in 
the first half of the year. Nonetheless, spreads 
have risen slightly since mid-January. Domestic 
equity markets in Latin America also benefited 
from this favourable situation, and some record-
ed the highest annual earnings among stock 
markets worldwide.
These favourable stock market and financial 
developments in the area contrasted somewhat 
with the course of economic activity, which only 
began to show clear signs of acceleration in 
most countries in 2003 Q4. Behind the delay in 
and gradualness of economic recovery is the 
economic adjustment made in recent years in a 
large number of countries and the tightening of 
macroeconomic policies that accompanied it. 
As financial market tensions were overcome 
and inflation progressively moderated, the mon-
etary policy stance began to be eased, although 
this process has slowed in 2004 Q1. Converse-
ly, fiscal policies remained restrictive, owing to 
the persistent vulnerability of public finances. In 
these circumstances, external demand was 
once again the driving force of growth in 2003. 
The marked rise in commodity prices and the 
increase in world demand in the second half of 
the year, against a backdrop of stable exchange 
rates, were conducive to prolonging the buoy-
ancy of exports, which remains the case into 
2004. Although domestic demand is expected 
progressively to replace this external momen-
tum, the process may take some time due to 
the depth of the cumulative income adjustment 
in recent years. 
2.  ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREA
2.1. Economic activity
In contrast to the marked weakness in the 
first six months, activity in the region quickened 
notably in 2003 Q4 (3% growth compared with 
the same period a year earlier), after remaining 
slack in Q3. GDP thus posted a rate of 1.3% in 
2003 as a whole (see Chart 2). The rise was 
across the board but, as in the first half of the 
year, it was much sharper in the countries beset 
by economic crisis in 2002, namely Argentina, 
Uruguay and Venezuela, which ended the year 
with growth rates close to 10%. Excluding these 
countries, the year-on-year rate of increase of 
GDP in the area would have fallen to 1.5% in 
Q4 and annual growth in 2003 would have been 
cut by 0.6 pp.
Growth tended to quicken in most countries 
towards the end of the year, except in Peru, 
which was ahead in the cycle. There was slug-
gish growth in Brazil in the second half of the 
year: its year-on-year growth was negative in 
Q3 and practically zero in Q4, placing the rate 
for 2003 as a whole at -0.2%, the first negative 
rate since 1992. Argentina recorded the highest 
annual rate of growth for the year (8.7%), follow-
ing heavy declines in the two previous years. 
Next came the countries with growth rates of 
between 4% and 3%: Peru, Colombia and Chile, 
in that order. Growth in Mexico was low at 1.3%, 
and Venezuela underwent a severe recession, 
with a fall in GDP of over 9%.
The pick-up in industrial output was not as 
sharp as expected, in the light of the firming of 
the world recovery. The related year-on-year 
rates turned positive during Q3, taking root to-
wards the end of the year. There was an in-
crease of 5.2% in December on a year earlier 
(which saw the year end with a rise of 1.1% in 
relation to 2002), although the slowdown evi-
dent in some of the early data for 2004 high-
Sources: BEA, National Statistics Offices and Eurostat.
(a) Annual variation in %.
(b) 2003 Q4: estimate.
(c) US industrial firm bond with a B1 rating.
450
550
650
750
850
950
1,050
Jan-03 Apr-03 Jul-03 Oct-03 Jan-04
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
EMBI LATIN AMERICA
EMBI OTHER COUNTRIES (right-hand scale)
US HIGH-YIELD BOND (c) (right-hand scale)
INTEREST RATE SPREADS OVER US TREASURY BONDS
basis pointsbasis points
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
2001 2002 2003
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
UNITED STATES
EURO AREA (b)
LATIN AMERICA
JAPAN
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (a)
CHART 1
Real GDP and interest rates
%%
HALF-YEARLY REPORT ON THE LATIN-AMERICAN ECONOMY
BANCO DE ESPAÑA / ECONOMIC BULLETIN / ABRIL 2004 67
Sources: National Statistics Offices, IMF and own calculations.
2002 2003
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Real GDP (y-o-y change) in %
Argentina -4,4 -10,8 8,7 -16,3 -13,5 -9,8 -3,4 5,4 7,7 10,1 11,3
Brazil 1,4 1,9 -0,2 -0,5 1,4 3,0 3,9 1,9 -1,1 -1,5 -0,1
Mexico -0,3 0,7 1,3 -2,2 2,0 1,8 1,8 2,5 0,1 0,6 2,0
Chile 3,1 2,1 3,3 1,3 1,7 2,4 3,2 3,7 2,8 3,0 3,3
Colombia 1,4 1,8 3,7 0,0 2,3 2,0 2,6 3,8 2,3 4,1 4,4
Venezuela 2,7 -8,8 -8,9 -3,8 -9,1 -5,6 -16,7 -27,9 -9,6 -7,2 9,0
Peru -0,1 5,1 4,0 3,2 6,3 5,1 4,7 6,0 3,6 3,5 2,9
Uruguay -3,1 -10,8 -5,5 -13,6 -13,1 -8,3 -4,8 7,1 15,7
LA - 8 0,4 -0,2 1,3 -2,5 -0,3 0,7 1,2 0,9 0,3 0,9 3,0
CPI (y-o-y change) in %
Argentina -1,1 25,9 14,8 4,2 23,3 36,0 40,3 35,7 14,5 5,2 3,7
Brazil 6,8 8,5 14,8 7,6 7,8 7,6 10,6 15,6 16,9 15,2 11,4
Mexico 6,4 5,0 4,6 4,7 4,8 5,2 5,3 5,4 4,7 4,1 4,0
Chile 3,1 2,9 2,8 2,4 2,2 2,4 2,9 3,8 3,7 2,7 1,1
Colombia 8,0 6,4 7,1 6,6 5,9 6,0 6,8 7,4 7,6 7,1 6,4
Venezuela 12,5 22,4 31,4 14,6 18,9 24,8 30,6 35,4 34,1 29,6 26,2
Peru 2,0 0,2 2,3 -1,0 0,1 0,3 1,4 2,8 2,4 1,9 1,9
Uruguay 4,4 14,0 20,0 4,6 7,1 18,9 25,0 27,9 26,3 15,0 10,7
LA - 8 5,8 9,2 11,1 6,1 8,3 10,0 12,1 14,0 12,2 10,0 8,0
Public-sector balance (% GDP)
Argentina -3,0 -1,5 0,4 -3,2 -2,0 -2,2 -1,3 -0,7 0,0 0,5 0,4
Brazil -5,2 -10,5 -3,7 -4,9 -7,1 -8,9 -10,3 -10,2 -6,5 -3,7 -3,7
Mexico -0,7 -1,2 -0,7 -1,0 -0,5 -0,6 -1,1 -0,6 -0,5 -0,6 -0,7
Chile -0,3 -0,8 -1,4 -0,9 -1,3 -1,2 -0,8 -0,3 -0,5 -1,1 -1,4
Colombia -4,3 -3,6 -2,8 (p) -4,3 -5,2 -5,4 -3,6 -3,5 -2,0 … …
Venezuela -4,5 -1,0 -4,5 (p) -5,8 -4,4 -4,0 -1,2 -1,4 -1,7 … …
Peru -2,4 -2,2 -1,8 -3,0 -2,8 -2,7 -2,2 -1,9 -1,8 -1,7 -1,8
Uruguay -4,5 -5,1 -5,2 -4,9 -4,4 -5,2 -5,1 -5,1 -6,8 -5,8 -5,2
LA - 8 -3,2 -4,9 -2,2 (p) -3,3 -3,9 -4,6 -4,8 -4,5 -3,3 -2,0 -2,0
Public debt (% GDP)
Argentina 53,8 140,0 … 100,6 114,1 142,6 144,9 142,0 109,8 122,7 …
Brazil 52,6 56,5 58,2 54,3 57,3 62,5 55,5 55,0 55,6 58,1 58,2
Mexico 22,4 24,4 26,1 23,3 22,9 24,0 22,9 23,5 23,2 25,3 26,1
Chile 11,8 12,3 13,3 11,3 11,6 12,3 11,9 12,3 11,9 11,9 13,3
Colombia 44,3 50,5 … 43,8 44,3 48,1 47,6 51,3 50,0 … …
Venezuela 46,4 47,1 77,6 45,5 46,5 50,3 59,5 54,4 58,9 66,7 77,6
Peru 46,1 47,0 46,6 47,4 41,6 46,8 46,6 47,7 42,1 46,3 46,6
Uruguay 54,0 97,4 … 82,4 86,0 97,9 97,4 98,4 100,4 104,9 …
LA - 8 40,8 51,7 … 45,9 48,1 54,0 51,8 51,3 48,4 … …
Current-account balance (% GDP)
Argentina -1,7 9,8 5,7 -0,1 3,8 8,1 10,1 10,0 7,4 6,8 5,7
Brazil -4,6 -1,7 1,0 -4,0 -4,4 -3,6 -1,9 -1,1 0,3 0,9 1,0
Mexico -2,9 -2,2 -1,6 -2,6 -2,4 -2,5 -2,2 -2,1 -1,9 -1,8 -1,6
Chile -1,8 -0,9 -0,8 -1,0 -0,8 -1,1 -1,3 -1,3 -1,5 -0,7 -0,8
Colombia -1,5 -1,9 -2,7 (p) -1,2 -1,3 -1,6 -1,9 -2,4 -2,1 -2,1 …
Venezuela 1,7 9,5 14,6 0,4 0,8 4,5 9,2 11,2 15,1 13,5 14,6
Peru -2,2 -2,1 -1,8 -1,9 -1,8 -1,9 -2,1 -2,3 -2,3 -2,1 -1,8
Uruguay -2,6 2,1 … -4,1 -2,4 -0,3 2,1 1,2 1,9 1,4 …
LA - 8 -2,9 -0,1 1,1 (p) -2,4 -2,1 -1,3 -0,1 0,2 0,8 1,0 1,1 (p)
External debt (% GDP)
Argentina 52,2 136,9 112,1 115,9 130,7 143,9 141,6 133,7 101,0 107,9 112,1
Brazil 41,6 51,9 … 41,1 43,7 51,4 57,3 54,0 45,3 43,5 …
Mexico 23,1 21,6 … 22,7 21,5 23,1 21,7 23,9 22,2 23,6 …
Chile 56,2 62,2 62,7 56,7 53,6 62,2 62,7 60,9 56,6 58,4 62,7
Colombia 44,4 39,7 … 42,2 40,1 45,6 45,1 48,9 46,4 45,5 …
Venezuela 36,0 57,8 … 42,5 50,8 68,5 68,4 68,1 67,0 … …
Peru 50,7 49,3 47,8 51,7 45,3 50,6 49,0 49,9 44,1 47,9 47,8
Uruguay 47,9 90,2 … 79,1 89,4 89,0 90,2 86,4 87,7 90,1 …
LA - 8 39,2 52,0 … 45,2 47,2 54,1 55,6 54,2 46,7 … …
2001 2002 2003
TABLE 1
Latin America: relevant macroeconomic indicators
2,5 -10,8
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lights the uncertainty over the firming of activity 
in the region.
Following a prolonged period of slackness, 
domestic demand showed signs of picking up, 
especially in Q4, as indicated by the trend of 
retail sales (see Chart 3). Despite this, domestic 
demand contributed scarcely 0.6 pp to year-on-
year growth for the area as a whole in the sec-
ond half of 2003. Highly influential here was the 
stagnation in Brazil and Mexico. Also notable 
were the divergences in regional behaviour in 
respect of the domestic demand components. 
Private investment, which as a percentage of 
GDP has fallen over the region as a whole by 
almost 3 pp since 1998 (to below 16%), led the 
pick-up in domestic demand in the second half 
of the year in countries such as Colombia and, 
to a lesser extent, Brazil, where consumption 
remained very depressed throughout the period. 
Paradoxically, in other countries with better 
prospects of stability such as Chile and, above 
all, Mexico, the pace of the recovery in invest-
ment was relatively slow, and private consump-
tion was the most dynamic domestic demand 
component. The easing in monetary policies 
throughout last year and improved consumer 
(see Chart 3) and business confidence, which 
rose across the board, should contribute to ac-
celerating the momentum of domestic demand. 
Yet a high degree of wariness remains when it 
comes to addressing new investment plans and 
taking on labour. Only in the second half of the 
year did the labour market begin to show a 
muted improvement in some countries (see 
Chart 4), although the limited quality of the re-
gion’s labour statistics hampers analysis. On 
one hand, although the aggregate unemploy-
ment rate initiated a slight reduction in 2003 Q4, 
the change compared with a year earlier was 
positive and slightly greater than that of the pre-
vious year, as the sound performance of Argen-
tina was offset by rises in unemployment in 
Brazil and, above all, in Mexico. On the other, 
the marked loss of the purchasing power of 
wages, intensified by the inflationary surge be-
tween 2002 and 2003 Q1, was checked in the 
second half of the year. That said, real wages in 
the region at the end of the year were still 10% 
below those recorded at the outset of 2002, due 
above all to their far-reaching deterioration in 
Brazil and Argentina.
External demand thus remained the main 
underpinning of activity over the year as a 
whole, although its contribution to year-on-year 
GDP growth in the second half of the year was 
substantially lower than in the first six months 
(estimated at 1 pp compared with 2.8 pp in the 
first six months -- see Chart 3). The prolonga-
tion of external momentum in the second half of 
the year is, in any event, notable. The basis for 
this was the highly favourable performance of 
commodity prices - extensive to all the main 
components (see Chart 5) - and the strengthen-
ing of world growth. Further, the weakness of 
the dollar against the rest of the developed 
countries, set against the stability of the Latin-
American currencies vis-à-vis the dollar, miti-
gated losses in competitiveness. All these de-
velopments were favourable to exports; after 
Source: National Statistics Offices.
(a) Includes the eight countries depicted.
(b) Annual percentage change.
(c) Excluding Argentina, Venezuela and Uruguay.
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temporarily declining in Q3, the growth rate of 
exports quickened to over 11% year-on-year in 
2003 Q4, signifying an annual average increase 
of a similar amount to that in 2002. Exports 
showed sustained resilience in Brazil, where 
they continued growing at a year-on-year rate of 
over 25% at the end of the year. This buoyancy 
was in contrast to the delay with which Mexico 
harnessed the momentum of the US economy, 
although this delay has been slowly corrected in 
recent months. There was a gradual though 
moderate acceleration in import growth across 
the region (9.4% in 2003 Q4, and 2.6% in the 
year as a whole). This allowed a comfortable 
and growing trade surplus of close to 5% of 
GDP in 2003 to be sustained throughout the re-
gion. Of the main countries, only Mexico and 
Colombia closed the year with a small trade 
deficit, while the surplus in Chile and Brazil 
amounted to around 5% of GDP; in Argentina it 
exceeded 13% of GDP, although a turnaround 
was apparent in the second half of the year.
During the coming quarters the composition 
of Latin American growth is expected to shift to-
wards domestic demand, although this is taking 
place more slowly than anticipated. It is also 
likely that the current-account balance is about 
to reach, if it has not done so already, a turning 
point. In any event, the profile of the current-ac-
count balance continued to improve in the sec-
ond half of the year, in parallel with the trade 
balance (see Chart 5), providing for a current-
account surplus of 1.1% of GDP for the area as 
Sources: National Statistics Offices.
(a) For retail sales: % change year-on-year, three-month moving
average. For consumer confidence: index level.
(b) 2003 H2: estimate.
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a whole in 2003, for the first time since 1988. 
Although the trade surplus made the main con-
tribution to this improvement, the other compo-
nents also contributed favourably, as Chart 5 
shows. The income balance - which includes in-
terest payments on external debt - worsened by 
only 0.1 pp of GDP, which reflects lower financ-
ing costs and the particular situation of the Ar-
gentine debt default. The balance of transfers, 
for its part, made a more sizable contribution 
(0.32 pp), which was particularly notable in 
Mexico and Colombia owing to the increase in 
emigrants’ remittances. Among the main econo-
mies in the area, only Colombia posted simulta-
neously a current-account deficit (-2.7% of 
GDP) and a deterioration therein, due above all 
to the worsening of the income balance. In the 
remaining countries, greater domestic absorp-
tion will not foreseeably give rise to worrying 
external imbalances in the short and medium 
term, in view of the comfortable position from 
which they are departing. This is particularly 
important in a region in which such imbalances 
have repeatedly curtailed the duration of expan-
sionary phases.
2.2.  Financial markets 
and external financing
The sound performance of the external posi-
tion coincided with international investors’ con-
tinuing favourable perception of Latin American 
assets, which has seen the year close with a 
very favourable result for the financial markets. 
Sovereign spreads thus continued to narrow 
during the second half of the year (see Chart 
6), albeit at a more tempered rate than in the 
first six months: a 25% decline compared with 
31% in the first half of the year for the region’s 
aggregate differential. In Venezuela and Peru 
the decline accelerated notably in the second 
half of the year.  
The narrowing of differentials was across the 
board in all emerging markets (as the substan-
tial increase in correlations between their 
spreads reveals), encompassing credit-rated 
and speculative issuers virtually indistinctively. 
The bonds of the Latin American countries with 
the biggest sovereign spreads benefited from 
this to a greater extent, as Chart 6 shows. Sig-
nificantly, there was a marked contrast between 
the strong fall in differentials and the stability of 
ratings in most countries. Only Argentina, Vene-
zuela and, in February this year, Ecuador saw 
their ratings upgraded by the main agencies. 
These features reflect the significance of ex-
ternal (or push) factors in determining capital 
flows towards the region in 2003. Box 1 analy-
ses these factors in greater detail, together with 
domestic (or pull) factors. Of particular note 
were the ample liquidity worldwide and the low-
er risk-aversion of financial markets, which 
prompted a search for assets with a higher re-
turn. The forceful inflow of funds to emerging 
markets was also conducive to less discrimina-
tion between countries, arising in part from the 
prominent role played by non-specialist inves-
tors last year. Adding to this was the better posi-
tion of the economies in the region where, gen-
erally, price stability and fiscal discipline were 
safeguarded, exchange rates were more com-
Sources: Datastream and JP Morgan.
(a) EMBI indexes from JP Morgan.
50
150
250
350
450
550
650
750
Jan-03 May-03 Sep-03 Jan-04
50
150
250
350
450
550
650
750
MEXICO
COLOMBIA
CHILE
BASIS POINTS OVER US TREASURIES (a)
bpbp
500
1,500
2,500
3,500
4,500
5,500
6,500
7,500
Jan-03 May-03 Sep-03 Jan-04
300
500
700
900
1,100
1,300
1,500
1,700
1,900
ARGENTINA (left-hand scale)
BRAZIL
VENEZUELA
bpbp
BASIS POINTS OVER US TREASURIES (a)
CHART 6
Sovereign spreads
BRAZIL
VENEZUELA
URUGUAY
MEXICO
COLOMBIA
CHILE PERU
ECUADOR
-70
-60
-50
-40
-30
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000
CHANGE IN SOVEREIGN SPREADS SINCE JANUARY 2003
Level (bp) as at January 2003
Change (as a % of initial level)
HALF-YEARLY REPORT ON THE LATIN-AMERICAN ECONOMY
BANCO DE ESPAÑA / ECONOMIC BULLETIN / ABRIL 2004 71
BOX 1
Determinants of and outlook for capital flows to Latin America
The year 2003 saw the downward trend in capital 
flows to Latin America since 1998 cease. To assess 
whether this recovery is transitory or will firm, it is worth 
describing and analysing the explanatory factors identi-
fied as relevant in determining capital flows to the region. 
Two types of factors can be distinguished: push factors, 
related to the economic and financial conditions of the 
countries from which the flows stem (the developed 
countries and, in the case of Latin America, the United 
States in particular); and pull factors, related to the risk/
return characteristics of investment in the recipient coun-
try. A third factor – degree of financial integration – might 
be added; this determines the readiness with which capi-
tal is transferred, and during the nineties it experienced a 
strong boost in Latin America and worldwide, prompted 
by the process of capital account liberalisation. While the 
evidence is not conclusive concerning the relative signifi-
cance of these determinants, there is some consensus 
that the push factors determine the scale of the flows, 
while the pull factors influence their geographical distribu-
tion. The theoretical and empirical bodies of literature 
have identified the following as the main push factors: the 
business cycle in the developed countries; the degree of 
risk aversion, since emerging countries’ assets are per-
ceived as high-risk; the level of interest rates in the devel-
oped countries, as they determine liquidity and the 
search for alternative investments; and the external fi-
nancing requirements of the industrialised countries, 
since to some extent they compete for foreign capital. 
The most salient pull factors in macroeconomic terms are 
Latin America’s growth differential vis-à-vis other regions 
and the degree of macroeconomic stability and vulnera-
bility. These two factors would proxy for the dimension of 
investment risk. Notable among structural factors are: 
structural reform processes, the degree of regional inte-
gration, and the development and stability of the institu-
tional framework of the recipient country. These factors 
are particularly relevant for attracting foreign direct in-
vestment flows, the biggest component of total flows in 
Latin America since the mid-nineties (see adjoining 
chart), and which, since the end of the decade, have fallen to less than half the total to scarcely $30 billion (the estimate 
for 2003).
The two panels in the accompanying chart depict the relationship between the push factors identified and private 
capital flows to Latin America since the eighties. In the strong fall-off in flows between 1998 and 2002, the business cy-
cle and risk-aversion (measured by the yield spread between US junk bonds and Treasury bonds) and the growing US 
external deficit would have performed as expected. The pull factors have also played a relevant role, as inferred by the 
sharper fall in flows in Latin America than in other emerging regions. This is possibly related to investors’ worsening 
perception of legal security and institutional stability, in the wake above all of the events in Argentina in recent years. 
Other pull factors bearing adversely on capital flows, such as economic volatility, economic stagnation and also stalling 
reforms, have a sizable endogenous component, since the fall-off in flows has prompted a strong economic adjustment 
and has hindered sustaining the pace of reform. 
The pick-up in private capital flows in 2003 may likewise be interpreted as the reversal of most of the foregoing fac-
tors, at the same time as ample global liquidity conditions remained in place. The prolongation of a propitious external 
environment and the pick-up in growth in the region should contribute to the recovery in flows firming. Nonetheless, 
even in this favourable scenario, flows will not foreseeably resume the high levels seen in the mid-nineties ($70 billion 
on average in the region), since direct investment flows, which underpinned that earlier expansion, are hardly likely to 
regain their previous momentum. True, there is recent empirical evidence that prior direct investment exerts a carry-over 
effect on future investment and that, given Latin America’s dependence on external financing, the region’s countries will 
strive to retain their attractiveness to foreign investment. But other structural and institutional factors will probably be 
dominant. First, investors’ perception of political risk has increased, which will give rise to greater caution when under-
taking investment projects. Further, other investment destinations among the emerging countries, such as China or the 
central and eastern European countries, have become relatively more attractive in recent times. And finally, given the 
unpopularity of reforms, governments’ appetite for privatisation has also waned. The limited estimates available for 2004 
(IMF, IIF) would support this diagnosis, since they point to moderate growth of direct investment flows (between 10% 
and 30%). This increase would enable capital flows to settle at around $40 billion this year, but direct investment flows 
would be far from those seen in the second half of the nineties.
Source: IMF.
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petitive, external positions improved and the 
adverse effects of the earlier strong adjustment 
on activity gradually faded.
In any event, the current low levels of 
spreads make it more difficult for them to con-
tinue narrowing. Indeed, following the minimum 
levels observed in mid-January, the market has 
started to become more sensitive to bad news 
and there has been a slight widening of differ-
entials in 2004 Q1.
Better financing conditions were accompa-
nied by a notable recovery in net capital flows to 
Latin America. A level of over $30 billion was at-
tained in 2003, compared with $23 billion in 
2002 (see Chart 7). This pick-up was sharper 
than in other emerging regions. The breakdown 
by component of these flows provides, however, 
a less favourable reading. Approximately one-
quarter of net inflows were official flows, largely 
related to support by multilateral agencies to 
the economic programmes adopted to tackle 
the bouts of instability in recent years. Con-
versely, bank loans - included under the head-
ing of Other investment - continued to show net 
outflows, albeit in more moderate amounts than 
in previous years. Of greater concern was the 
fourth consecutive annual reduction in net direct 
investment flows, which stood slightly below 
$30 million, since their previous high levels had 
provided capital flows to the region with a basis 
of stability. Finally, portfolio investment - which 
includes bond issues and equity investment - 
posted a net inflow for the first time since 2000.
The availability of external financing was 
also reflected in an increase in Latin American 
bond issues on global markets, accounting for 
almost half the total for emerging economies, a 
similar proportion to that of the previous year. 
Gross issues amounted to $41 billion in 2003, 
distributed in a relatively uniform manner over 
the year as a whole (see Chart 7). This figure is 
almost twice that for 2002 and, though it is nota-
bly below that of previous years, it should be 
borne in mind that Argentina was then a very 
active player in the primary bond market, from 
which it is now absent. During the second half 
of the year, the main issuer was Brazil ($8.9 bil-
lion), although there was a notable $4 billion is-
sue by Venezuela in relatively good conditions 
despite its precarious internal situation. The split 
between sovereign and corporate debt showed 
a slight predominance of the former (56% of the 
total), although the proportion of corporate debt 
increased notably in relation to prior years and, 
in 2003 Q4, even exceeded sovereign debt. The 
year 2004 has started with issues - especially of 
sovereign debt - showing renewed vigour. That 
has allowed countries such as Chile or Mexico 
to cover their issuance programme for the entire 
year, with Brazil having covered more than half 
of its scheduled issue.
Like the debt markets, stocks in the region 
performed well, although here most earnings 
were recorded in the second half of the year 
(see Chart 8). The Latin-American indices end-
ed the year with rises far above those of the in-
dustrialised countries and sharper than those of 
Sources: JP Morgan,National Central Banks,IMF.
(a) Quarterly average.
(b) January and February 2004, and an estimate for March 2004.
(c) Argentina did not issue in the period considered. Peru issued
a sovereign bond for $375m.
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most emerging markets. The rise in the weight-
ed index for the area as a whole was 67.1%, 
two-thirds of which was in the second half of the 
year. Most markets saw increases close to or 
higher than 50%. The indices virtually doubled 
in Brazil and Peru, and Argentina and Venezue-
la posted even higher increases (120% and 
195%, respectively). Supporting these rises was 
the return of foreign investors, especially in Bra-
zil (with net foreign inflows of almost $3 billion) 
and Chile. However, the rising trend on stock 
markets has ceased during 2004 Q1 in coun-
tries such as Brazil, Chile and Argentina, further 
to doubts about foreign investors maintaining 
favourable sentiment towards the region.
2.3. Macroeconomic policies 
Greater capital inflows prompted upward 
pressure on most of the countries’ currencies, 
which was countered by an active intervention 
and reserves-building policy (see Chart 8). Ex-
change rates were thus notably stable in the 
second half of the year, in contrast to the appre-
ciations seen in the first six months. For 2003 
as a whole, there was an appreciation across 
the board against the dollar (8.6% for the re-
gional aggregate), but one which was much 
more moderate in terms of the nominal effective 
exchange rate (1.1%) owing to the weakness of 
the dollar against the rest of the main curren-
cies. Two currencies must be excluded from this 
general picture: the Chilean peso, which appre-
ciated by 9.8% against the dollar in the second 
half of the year, making for an annual apprecia-
tion of over 20%; and the Mexican peso, which 
depreciated as from May and hit a low against 
the dollar in October, ending the year with a de-
preciation of 5%. Finally, the Venezuelan bolivar 
was devalued in February, against the backdrop 
of strict exchange controls. 
The increase in foreign reserves (over $34 
billion) was notable in the region as a whole, al-
lowing historical maximum levels to be regained. 
The countries that benefited most were those 
that had undergone the biggest erosion during 
the foreign exchange turbulence of previous 
years: in Brazil and Argentina, currency re-
serves climbed by $4.7 billion and $10.4 billion, 
although their levels are still below those 
reached prior to the Russian crisis. Mexico and 
Venezuela, meantime, also posted very notable 
increases ($8 billion and $9.3 billion), continu-
ing the rising trend of recent years. Conversely, 
reserves in Chile and Colombia held stable, re-
flecting less intervention on the foreign ex-
change markets. 
The stability of the exchange rate and the 
lagged effects of previous appreciations contrib-
uted to inflation continuing to perform favourably 
in the second half of 2003 (see Chart 9). The 
year-on-year rate for the region as a whole 
stood at 8% in Q4, the lowest figure since early 
2002. Despite this favourable trajectory, average 
inflation in 2003 exceeded that of the previous 
year (11% against 9.1%), one of the highest 
figures among the emerging regions. Of the 
countries with direct inflation targets, only Chile 
and Peru comfortably met theirs. Inflation in 
Source: Datastream.
(a) Index January 2003 = 100.
(b) An increase denotes an appreciation against the dollar.
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Mexico stood right at the upper limit of the tar-
get range (4%), and Brazil and Colombia ex-
ceeded it (9.3% and 6.5%, respectively). There 
was also a notable downturn in inflation in Ar-
gentina which, against all expectations, ended 
the year with one of the best figures for the re-
gion (3.7%). And it has continued to fall in early 
2004, despite robust activity. In contrast, Uru-
guay and Venezuela ended the year with dou-
ble-digit inflation rates (10.9% and 26.9%, re-
spectively). In the opening months of 2004 infla-
tion has shown greater downward stickiness 
and has even risen in year-on-year terms in 
some countries such as Mexico. While results 
have not been outstanding and targets have 
been exceeded in a number of cases, the as-
sessment of recent inflation developments in 
Latin America is relatively favourable if regard is 
had to the previous exchange rate adjustment 
most of the countries underwent. The notable 
ability to cushion the pass-through of previous 
exchange rate depreciations to final prices - as-
sisted also by greater rigour in combating infla-
tion and by the environment of productive slack-
ness - may have in turn enhanced the reputa-
tion of the monetary authorities.
In general, inflation and exchange rate de-
velopments allowed interest rates to continue to 
fall throughout the second half of 2003, albeit at 
more moderate rates than at the start of the 
year. Brazil was an exception here, since the 
downward cycle only began in June but was 
very intense, meaning that the SELIC rate fell 
by 10 pp in the period to the end of the year. In 
Argentina, one-month interbank rates fell to 
very low levels of around 4.5%, signifying a de-
cline of 11 pp. In Chile easing continued apace 
in 2004 Q1, which placed rates below 2%, while 
in Mexico monetary policy was tightened 
through the raising of the short-term rate in 
February 2004.
With regard to fiscal policy, the results for the 
year were favourable (see Chart 10): the declin-
ing trend of deficits firmed and primary surplus-
es were obtained in most countries. The total 
deficit for the region thus contracted in 2003 to 
2.2% of GDP, against 4.9% the previous year. 
Contributing to this improvement in equal meas-
ures were the decline in financing costs and the 
increase in the primary surplus, which stood at 
2.8% of GDP, up 0.6 pp on 2002. The perform-
ance of tax revenue contributed to this outcome, 
albeit to a lesser extent than the previous year, 
and, moreover, it progressively lost steam as 
the year unfolded (the increase in nominal 
terms on 2002 was 13.3%, but year-on-year 
growth fell to 3.3% in Q4). Tax-raising difficulties 
in the region are deep-seated and related to the 
narrow tax base and to the structural problems 
of tax systems. In these circumstances, certain 
regionally rooted and unorthodox taxes have 
been retained and even extended, such as bank 
debit taxes (see Box 2), which impair the devel-
opment of the financial system. Some countries 
ran primary surpluses. This was due in some 
cases to robust economic expansion (Argenti-
na), but in others to notable expenditure re-
straint, as in Mexico and Brazil, where spending 
was cut in real terms. The Brazilian primary sur-
plus (4.3% of GDP) exceeded the IMF pro-
gramme target, and Mexico drew closer to a 
balanced budget. Chile was one of the few 
countries where public finances worsened, a 
development due to a counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy. This was in marked contrast to the other 
countries, which had to keep a tight fiscal 
stance as they did not have the room for ma-
noeuvre to pursue counter-cyclical measures.
Unlike what usually happened in the past, 
the greater availability and lower cost of exter-
nal financing did not translate last year into 
looser fiscal stances. The greater commitment 
Sources: National Central Banks.
(a) % change year-on-year.
(b) Brazil: SELIC; Mexico: three-month CETES; Chile: three-
month bank rate.
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BOX 2
Bank debit taxes in Latin America
Fiscal difficulties in Latin America in recent years have 
led to renewed resort to bank debit taxes (BDT)1. As the ac-
companying chart shows, a growing number of countries in 
the region have introduced these taxes, to the extent that 
currently, among the seven main economies, only Chile and 
Mexico do not levy them (see adjoining table). Another regu-
larity observed in recent years is that these taxes tend to 
last and in some cases have even become a quasi-perma-
nent tax, despite the fact the tax authorities usually declare 
them to be an exceptional measure on introduction, in re-
sponse to pressing tax-raising needs. The widespread appli-
cation of these taxes and their durability should be viewed 
with caution given their adverse effects on financing costs 
and on financial intermediation, aspects which tend to em-
bed some of the structural problems of the Latin American 
economies.
BDT chiefly tax the withdrawal of bank deposits and, in 
certain cases, other financial transactions such as the clear-
ing of cheques, transfers, etc.. BDT are attractive to the tax 
authorities mainly because of their low administration costs, 
their high tax-raising potential (due to their broad tax base 
and the difficulties of evasion) and the ease with which they 
can be applied, since it is financial institutions that collect 
them. Moreover, in economic policy terms, one of their ad-
vantages is that of scant visibility and the dispersion of those 
paying them, which discourages the formation of sufficiently 
organised lobbies opposing them. These features account for 
the notable resort to BDT in countries with relatively undevel-
oped tax systems, as is the case in Latin America, where 
their application has significantly and instantly helped raise 
short-term tax takings. Thus, in countries in which these tax-
es were levied in recent years applying a rate of between 
0.40% and 0.75% on the total transaction amount, the tak-
ings totalled between 1.35% and 1.75% of GDP, which ac-
counts for more than 10% of tax receipts in countries such as 
Colombia and Venezuela.
However, BDT have high costs. There are problems in 
that a multistage cumulative tax is involved and that it is not 
equitable; in addition to not being progressive (a feature 
shared with ad valorem taxes), it is the higher-income agents 
who can most easily elude BDT. Further, BDT can alter the relative attractiveness of different saving instruments. But their main 
disadvantage is that they bear on the core of the economy’s financial mechanism, namely bank deposits, which adds a distort-
ing element to them that far exceeds their scope of application. The distortion arises both via a price effect and a quantity effect. 
Regarding the former, there is evidence that depositors pay a large portion of BDT receiving lower interest on their savings, but 
another portion falls on borrowers, increasing the interest rate on bank credit.2 This may also entail higher financing costs for 
governments, which diminishes the net fiscal impact. As to the quantity effect, BDT: a) promote the use of cash to the detriment 
of bank deposits, lessening the fiscal authorities’ control over the economy; b) heighten the competitive advantage of offshore 
financial centres or of investment in ADRs; c) encourage the shifting of financial operations to another country; and d) offer an 
incentive for corporate vertical integration to promote self-financing. As a result of the foregoing the introduction of BDT reduces 
financial intermediation, a cause for particular concern in Latin America in view of the low prominence of banks in the region. 
Moreover, given the positive externality exerted by the financial system on economic development, the adverse effects of these 
taxes in the form of financial disintermediation feed through to the economy as a whole. 
Following the inauspicious experience in Argentina and Peru in the early nineties, it has been sought to reduce the harmful 
effects of BDT in recent years, complementing their application with additional measures. These include certain restrictions on 
the use of cash to prevent tax avoidance and financial disintermediation. In this way the progressive decline in tax revenue has 
been successfully tempered, a feature common to the experience of the countries in the region with this type of tax.
To conclude, BDT have been used as a tax-raising vehicle at times of fiscal difficulty. Despite their adverse effects, espe-
cially in the long run, BDT have proven relatively more successful when financial intermediation is high, the tax rate low, 
there is no great tradition of investment in offshore financial assets and there are mechanisms to combat evasion.  All such 
conditions appear to be met, for instance, in Brazil. In any event, from a fiscal perspective it is a relatively inefficient tax and, 
from an economic viewpoint, it is harmful for the development of the financial system and for the efficient allocation of re-
sources.
Year of
implementation
Current tax rate
Brazil 1997 0.38
Colombia 1999 0.30
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Brasil, 2001) calculates that, for Brazil, with a tax rate of 0.38%, the interest rate on credit increases by 2.7 percentage points.
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to fiscal discipline seen recently would be be-
hind this change in attitudes, but the persistent 
vulnerability of public finances also acted as a 
deterrent. Indeed, although there was success 
in improving the maturity profile and the struc-
ture of debt, and although interest payments as 
a proportion of revenue declined in 2003 com-
pared with the previous year (see Chart 10), the 
public debt/GDP ratio increased in most coun-
tries. In the region as a whole, the debt ratio 
rose by almost 4 pp if Argentina - where there 
was a marked contraction in debt (partly under 
suspension of payments) - is excluded. This 
downward stickiness of high public debt levels 
highlights the need for a prudent fiscal policy 
stance to be maintained in the coming years.
2.4. Reform and trade integration
After several years of stagnation, or in some 
cases recession as in Argentina and Venezuela, 
there was a timid re-launching of the reform 
process in 2003, albeit unevenly across the re-
gion. The vulnerability of public finances placed 
fiscal reform at the heart of government initia-
tives, the results of which differed greatly. While 
in Brazil the reform of the social security system 
was approved, along with incomplete plans for 
tax reform, attempts at tax reform in Mexico and 
Colombia were respectively rejected in parlia-
ment and at the polls.
In any event, the focus of the reforms cur-
rently reflects notable differences from those 
pursued in the nineties. Visibly, there is greater 
emphasis on the social aspects of reform and 
greater concern for the control of liberalisation 
processes, along with a tendency to tighten the 
regulatory framework of privatised services.
One of the pillars of the structural policies is 
trade integration, where there were also signifi-
cant developments during 2003. First, the Mer-
cosur agreement was reactivated. This saw the 
bolstering of certain initiatives, in particular inte-
gration with the Andean community, and the ex-
tension of agreements with other countries both 
within and outside Latin America. Further, nego-
tiations continued on the FTAA (Free Trade Area 
of the Americas), although there was very limit-
ed progress. The stagnation of the process 
means the entry into force of the agreement on 
schedule (2005) will be difficult, at least under 
the previously agreed single undertaking formu-
la. That suggests the FTAA may be set up under 
a lax framework in which the different countries 
move forward in the process of integration at 
different speeds. These obstacles arose in par-
allel with, and probably even reinforced, the 
headway in bilateral agreements with the United 
States. Notable among these were the entry 
Source: National Statistics Offices.
(a) Year-on-year change.
(b) Change in primary balance: % GDP 2002Q4 / 2003Q4.
(c) 2003Q2.
(d) 2003Q3.
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into force of the agreement with Chile, progress 
in the negotiation of the CAFTA (Central Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement) and an interest in 
entering into agreements with the Andean 
countries, which benefited from the extension of 
the preferential tariff arrangements.
3.  DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MAIN 
COUNTRIES
In Brazil, the impact of the adjustment and of 
economic policy tightening on activity lasted 
longer than expected. Consequently, Q4 ended 
with a 0.1% decline in GDP in year-on-year 
terms, placing growth for the whole of 2003 at 
–0.2%. That reflects the adverse behaviour of 
domestic demand, since private consumption 
shrank by 3.3% due to the reduction in wage 
income and high unemployment (see Chart 4), 
and investment declined by 6.6%. Such slug-
gish activity was not offset by the vigour of the 
external sector, despite the fact the year closed 
with a trade surplus of 5.9% of GDP. The mo-
mentum of exports, which grew by 22.6% on 
average in 2003, made for a current surplus of 
0.8% of GDP. That offset the reduction in financ-
ing flows, particularly foreign investment (-39%), 
as can be seen in Chart 11.
In respect of demand-side policies there was 
a sharp easing of monetary policy in the second 
half of the year, entailing a 10.25 pp cut, down 
to the current rate of 16.25%. This easing came 
about in step with the decline in inflation and its 
associated expectations, which were both as-
sisted by the weakness of demand and the ap-
preciation of the real. Despite this, the Decem-
ber inflation figure was 9.3%, meaning the an-
nual target set (8.5%) was exceeded for the 
third year running. The downward cycle of rates 
was interrupted in early 2004, but resumed in 
March. In the fiscal realm the authorities 
achieved a primary surplus of 4.3% thanks to 
the moderation of expenditure, since tax reve-
nue underwent a real decline of 2%. Despite 
fiscal discipline and the appreciation of the real, 
a high interest burden and scant nominal growth 
led to a rise in the public debt ratio (see Chart 
11) from 55.5% to 58.2% of GDP. Further, the 
authorities achieved their aim of reducing the 
weight of dollar-indexed debt. The financial mar-
kets continued to trend favourably in the second 
half of the year, which resulted in a marked re-
duction in risk premia and a notable increase in 
bond issues, which reached record figures in 
January. That said, spreads rebounded moder-
ately as from mid-January. The progress in 
structural reforms was also positive since, de-
spite difficulties, the definitive approval of the 
social security reform and of the first stage of 
the tax reform was achieved.
In Mexico, a pick-up was finally seen in 2003 
Q4, enabling a year-on-year GDP growth rate of 
2%. Annual growth for 2003 was thus 1.3%. 
During the second half of the year the contribu-
tion of domestic demand outpaced that of exter-
nal demand (see Chart 3). Among the domestic 
demand components, consumption and invest-
ment in construction exhibited the best results, 
while investment in capital goods remained 
weak. The recovery was accompanied by a fa-
vourable turnaround in manufacturing output 
and in non-oil exports, a somewhat delayed re-
sponse to the pick-up in US industrial output 
(see Chart 12). Nonetheless, the share of Mexi-
can products in US imports declined further, 
which prompted intense debate on Mexico’s 
loss of competitiveness against the emerging 
Asian economies, in particular China. In any 
Source: Banco Central do Brasil.
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event, compared with the previous year the cur-
rent-account deficit narrowed by 0.7 pp to 1.5% 
of GDP, thanks partly to the rise in emigrants’ 
remittances, which increased by 35.2% in an-
nual terms to somewhat over $13 billion.
Turning to prices, annual inflation at the 
close of 2003 was at the upper limit of the tar-
get range adopted by the Mexican central bank. 
However, much of the reduction in inflation was 
due to transitory components, since underlying 
inflation rose slightly. Since early 2004 the in-
crease in non-core inflation, along with the 
greater resilience of the recovery and wage be-
haviour, led the central bank to tighten monetary 
policy in mid-February and March, after having 
held it unchanged for most of the previous year. 
On the financial markets both equity and bonds 
performed favourably, placing their prices at an 
all-time high in early 2004. Both general govern-
ment and, above all, the corporate sector took 
advantage of this favourable environment to 
raise $2.3 billion on the debt markets. The Mexi-
can peso, for its part, exhibited marked volatility 
during the second half of the year. In November 
it hit a low for the year (entailing a depreciation 
of 9% on end-2002), but picked up thereafter. 
On the fiscal front the figures were favourable, 
and public finances posted their best result 
since 1996 (a deficit of 0.7% of GDP). However, 
the fiscal and energy reforms were at an im-
passe in the second half of the year.
The recovery in activity in Argentina gained 
fresh momentum in the second half of 2003, 
and this would have run into 2004 on the latest 
data. Year-on-year growth was 11.3% in Q4, 
while the year ended with a GDP increase of 
8.7% in relation to 2002. Growth continued to 
be domestic demand-led, and both private con-
sumption and investment sustained notable 
growth in Q4 (11.8% and 48.7%, respectively). 
In step with this momentum, imports were very 
robust (52%), though they are still far removed 
from pre-crisis levels (see Chart 13). Meanwhile 
exports slowed (7.4%), meaning the net contri-
bution of the external sector to growth was -2.4 
pp of GDP. The trade surplus for the year was 
12% of GDP and the current-account balance 
was 7.5% of GDP, although both turned down in 
the second half of the year. The fiscal perform-
ance, underpinned by the favourable course of 
tax revenue (40% in the year), complied with 
the targets agreed upon with the IMF, although 
the surplus revenue at the end of the year was 
partly earmarked for restoring wage income in 
the public sector (see Chart 13). The general 
government primary surplus stood at 3% and 
the total surplus at 0.5%, although regard 
should be had when assessing these favourable 
fiscal results to the fact that much of public debt 
is in default status. Buoyant production in sev-
eral industries and the freeze on credit meant 
com that economic expansion did not feed 
through to prices, which held stable in the sec-
ond half of the year and ended 2003 having in-
creased by 2.7%. This provided for the continu-
ing downward trend in interest rates, in step 
with the vigorous expansion of the monetary 
base, although the yield curve assumed a 
marked positive slope. The monetary expansion 
was supported by the replenishment of re-
serves, while the exchange rate held very stable 
throughout the second half of the year.
The performance of the rest of Argentina’s 
financial markets was uneven. The stock market 
trended favourably and the MERVAL index 
posted earnings exceeding 40% in the second 
half of the year. By contrast, the sovereign 
spread included in the EMBI stood at a higher 
level than that of the previous six months owing 
to the announced rescheduling of debt in Sep-
tember, which established a partial acquittance 
of 75%. Although after some setbacks the IMF 
Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática
(INEGI) and US Department of Commerce.
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approved the first two revisions of the agree-
ment reached in September, the international 
community’s relations with Argentina remain dif-
ficult, mainly because of problems tied to the 
foreign debt rescheduling process. 
The growth rate in Chile also rose slightly in 
the closing months of 2003 following a period of 
lower growth in Q2 and Q3. The year-on-year 
rate in Q4 was 3.3%, meaning the economy 
also grew by 3.3% in relation to 2002. This ac-
celeration came about due to the greater mo-
mentum of consumption, while investment was 
somewhat lacklustre. Despite the recent in-
crease in imports and the recent exchange rate 
appreciation, the rise in export prices, especially 
in mining items, meant there was a record trade 
surplus of almost $3 billion (see Chart 14). Giv-
en the absence of price pressures (inflation 
stood at 0% in February 2004) and the favoura-
ble course of the exchange rate, the central 
bank cut its official interest rate by 1 pp to a his-
torical low of 1.75%. In sum, the combination of 
a brighter external environment and a favoura-
ble series of domestic factors (improved confi-
dence indicators, the favourable trend of em-
ployment and real income gains) points to buoy-
ant activity foreseeably taking root in 2004.
Activity in Colombia regained momentum 
during the second half of the year. GDP growth 
in Q4, which rose to 4.3% year-on-year, dis-
pelled the uncertainty derived from the slow-
down experienced at the end of the previous 
six-month period. Annual growth thereby 
climbed to 3.7%, the highest rate since 1995. 
Construction, one of the most buoyant sectors 
in recent years, and mining were the driving 
force behind this pick-up. The effects on the la-
bour market were appreciable: the unemploy-
ment rate dipped to 14.1%, a similar rate to that 
of 1997, while the rate of job destruction dimin-
ished. Inflation stood at 6.5%, 0.5 pp up on the 
central bank’s upper target limit, but substan-
tially below the figure forecast in early 2003. 
Underpinning this performance was, among 
other factors, the appreciation of the Colombian 
peso. Against this background, the central bank 
cut its interest rate to 6.75% in February 2004, 
intervening actively on the foreign exchange 
markets to check the appreciation of the peso. 
The increase in commodity prices and the nar-
rowing of sovereign debt spreads made for a 
sustainable external position, although the cur-
rent-account deficit widened to 2.7% of GDP. 
The fiscal imbalance, by contrast, improved in 
relation to the previous year (2.9% on provi-
sional estimates, against 3.9% in 2002), al-
though the target initially agreed with the IMF 
was once again exceeded. Also notable in con-
nection with the fiscal realm was the non-ap-
proval of the referendum on tax reform (and on 
Sources: Ministerio de Economía (MECON) and Central Bank.
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other policies), which made the adoption of al-
ternative adjustment measures necessary.
In Venezuela, activity during Q4 rebounded 
significantly in relation to the previous quar-
ters, with GDP growth of 9% year-on-year. 
Even so, GDP in 2003 as a whole shrank by 
9.2%, the worst recession recorded in the 
country’s history, owing to the effects of the 
general strike in late 2002, the grinding to a 
halt of the oil industry and the introduction of 
exchange controls. The impetus to activity was 
from external demand, assisted by a rise in oil 
prices on international markets. Despite strict 
price controls being set in place, inflation held 
at a rate of over 20%. The central government 
accounts recorded a favourable result in 2003 
Q3. By contrast, monetary policy management 
was hampered by the delays in currency deliv-
ery to importers and the confrontation between 
the Venezuelan central bank and the Govern-
ment, brought on by the latter requesting the 
transfer of a portion of the country’s reserves 
to finance agricultural projects. In February the 
official exchange rate was devalued by 16.6%, 
although the new rate is still higher than that 
prevailing on the parallel market. Despite per-
sistent political uncertainty, the country’s im-
proved economic outlook and its sustainable 
external position allowed access to interna-
tional debt markets, where over $5 billion were 
placed between the second half of 2003 and 
2004 Q1.
Peru grew at a satisfactory rate during 2003, 
prolonging an expansion that has lasted for 22 
months despite its recurring domestic political 
problems. Nonetheless, in the last six months of 
the year activity slowed to a growth rate of 
around 3%, prompted by the moderation of pri-
vate consumption growth. Inflation ended the 
year at 2.5% (the target set by the central bank), 
providing for a continuing downward interest 
rate path. Despite setbacks in the approval of 
several tax regulations, public finances at the 
end of 2003 showed a primary surplus of 0.2%, 
and the debt ratio stabilised at below 47%.
In Uruguay, growth of 15.7% was posted in 
2003 Q4, driven by the pick-up in both domestic 
demand and external demand. As a result, an-
nual growth rose to 2.5%, far higher than ex-
pected. Inflation continued on a downward path 
and ended the year at 10.2%. Financial varia-
bles improved thanks to the favourable external 
setting and a stable domestic environment. The 
spread on sovereign debt thus narrowed to 
around 600 bp, while peso deposits grew by 
30% over the six-month period. Ecuador has 
recently benefited from a sovereign upgrade, 
although the growth of its economy slowed. 
Conversely, there was a serious political crisis 
in October in Bolivia, and banking problems 
persist in the   which has led to successive sov-
ereign downgrades.
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